Aceste cuvinte au fost rostite zilele acestea de Khodorkovsky, celebrul magnat rus (bagat in puscarie de Putin), fondatorul companiei Yukos, preluata ulterior de „stat”, printr-o schema extrem de dubioasa. Interviul cu magnatul rus il puteti citi aici.
E vorba de celebrul caz Yukos, in care atat PCA (Permanent Court of Arbitration) de la Haga, cat si ECtHR (European Court of Human Rights) de la Strasbourg s-au pronuntat de curand, Rusia fiind sanctionata cu 50 miliarde de dolari, respectiv 1, 8 mld euro.
Iata ce zice EctHR:
„Judgment on the question of just satisfaction in the Yukos v. Russia case
The Court held, by a majority:
that Russia was to pay the shareholders of Yukos as they had stood at the time of the company’s
liquidation and, if applicable, their legal successors and heirs 1,866,104,634 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage; and,
that Russia had to produce, in co-operation with the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers,
within six months from the date on which the judgment became final, a comprehensive plan for
distribution of the award of just satisfaction.
The Court further held, by a majority, that Russia was to pay EUR 300,000 in respect of costs and
expenses to the Yukos International Foundation.
The Court also held, unanimously, that the finding of a violation constituted in itself sufficient just
satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by Yukos”
Sa mai notam ca tot acum, iulie 2014, ECtHR decide :
„Unlawful arrest and detention of opposition leader following
In today’s Chamber judgment in the case of Nemtsov v. Russia (application no. 1774/11), which is
not final, the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:
a violation of Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European Convention on
a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial);
a violation of Article 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security);
a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment); and,
a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) in conjunction with Article 3.
The case concerned the arrest and detention of Boris Nemtsov, a well-known opposition leader,
following his participation in a political demonstration, and his subsequent conviction for an
The Court found in particular that the interference with Mr Nemtsov’s right to freedom of assembly
had been arbitrary and that the proceedings against him had the serious potential to deter others
from participating in demonstrations and open political debate.”
„The Court held that Russia was to pay Mr Nemtsov 26,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage and EUR 2,500 in respect of costs and expenses.”
Desi discutam de o alta speta, avem de-a face tot cu un abuz al Rusiei. Rusia lui Putin, vinovata atat in cazul Yukos cat si in cazul Nemtsov.
Revenind la Yukos,In cazul judecat la PCA discutam de trei „reclamantii”:
Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation
Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v. The Russian Federation
Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation
Decizia Curtii este in favoarea lor, astfel:
1888. For the reasons set forth above, the Tribunal unanimously:
(a) DISMISSES the objections to jurisdiction and/or admissibility, based on
Article 21 of the Energy Charter Treaty;
(b) DISMISSES the objections to jurisdiction and/or admissibility, pertaining to
Respondent’s contentions concerning “unclean hands” and “illegal and bad faith
(c) DISMISSES the renewed objections to jurisdiction and/or admissibility based on
Article 26(3)(b)(i) of the Energy Charter Treaty;
(d) HOLDS that the present dispute is admissible and within the Tribunal’s
(e) DECLARES that Respondent has breached its obligations under Article 13(1) of
the Energy Charter Treaty;
(f) ORDERS Respondent to pay to Claimant Hulley Enterprises Limited damages in
the amount of USD 39,971,834,360;
(g) ORDERS Respondent to pay the amount of EUR 3,388,197 to Claimant Hulley
Enterprises Limited as reimbursement for the costs of the arbitration;
(h) ORDERS Respondent to pay the amount of USD 47,946,190 to Claimant Hulley
Enterprises Limited for a portion of the costs of its legal representation and
assistance in the arbitration proceedings; and
(i) ORDERS Respondent to pay to Claimant Hulley Enterprises Limited, if within
180 days of the issuance of this Award Respondent fails to pay in full the amounts
set forth in paragraphs (f), (g) and (h) above, post-award interest on any
outstanding amount starting from 15 January 2015, compounded annually.
Post-award interest shall be determined as the yield on 10-year U.S. treasury bonds
as of 15 January 2015 and then the dates of compounding yearly thereafter”
Cazurile au fost judecate de acelasi complet de judecatori:
“By agreement of the parties, the cases were heard together before identical arbitral tribunals. The arbitral tribunals were composed of The Hon. L. Yves Fortier PC CC OQ QC of Canada (as Chairman), Dr. Charles Poncet of Switzerland, and Judge Stephen M. Schwebel of the United States of America.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration served as registry.
In the Final Awards, the arbitral tribunals unanimously held that the Russian Federation had taken measures with the effect equivalent to an expropriation of Claimants’ investments in Yukos and thus had breached Article 13(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty. As a result, the Russian Federation was ordered to pay damages to compensate Claimants. At the same time, the arbitral tribunals found some contributory fault on behalf of Claimants, leading them to reduce the amount of damages awarded.”
Sa notam ca decizia a fost luata in unanimitate, dupa 1o ani de analiza pe caz, mii de documnete studiate, de trei judecatori alesi, unul de reclamant, altul de reclamat si al 3-lea de primii doi numiti si agreat de PCA.
Speculatiile cum ca decizia (PCA avand sediul la Haga) ar avea vreo legatura cu evenumentele nefericite din Ucraina, inclusiv cu doborarea avionului civil, cu foarte multi morti din Olanda, nu-si au rostul, procesul a inceput in 2004, acum 10 ani, si era din ce in ce mai clar ca Rusia va pierde. De altfel Khodorkovsky remarca, pe buna dreptate, retragera Rusiei din Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in 2009
„By 2009, 5 years of the arbitral proceedings, after it had become clear that the defendant’s situation was nothing like what it had thought it to be, the authorities announced withdrawal from the Energy Charter. They already understood back in 2009 that they had lost the case, long before the current conflict. For a few more years they remained active, but brutal sabotage didn’t start until about a year ago.”
„On 20 August 2009 the Russian Federation has officially informed the Depository that it did not intend to become a Contracting Party to the Energy Charter Treaty and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects. In accordance with Article 45(3(a)) of the Energy Charter Treaty, such notification results in Russia’s termination of its provisional application of the ECT and the PEEREA upon expiration of 60 calendar days from the date on which the notification is received by the Depository.”
OK, am putea spune ca nici alti mari producatori de petrol nu sunt membri – SUA, Arabia Saudita, Kuweit, Venezuela, Iran etc, avand statut de observatori invitati , Tratatul fiind, in fond,o inventie europeana.
The Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects were signed in December 1994 and entered into legal force in April 1998. To date, the Treaty has been signed or acceded to by fifty-two states, the European Community and Euratom (the total number of its members is therefore fifty-four).
The Treaty was developed on the basis of the 1991 Energy Charter. Whereas the latter document was drawn up as a declaration of political intent to promote energy cooperation, the Energy Charter Treaty is a legally-binding multilateral instrument.
The fundamental aim of the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-related investment and trade.”
Dar pana la urma Rusia a “aplicat” din 17 decembrie 1994 pana in 18 octombrie 2009, in perioada cu pricina (2003-2004) fiind membru.
Ce efect va avea decizia PCA? Probabil ca Rusia o va ataca, lungind cu inca 10 ani tarasenia:
“Russia is expected to appeal, and Yukos’ former chief legal counselor Dmitry Gololobov was quoted by Bloomberg as saying the country could hire the best international lawyers, which would extend “the affair” by another ten years. -
Poate ca ar fi util sa ne amintim cronologia desfasurarii „afacerii” Yukos:
- aprilie 1993 – ia nastere Yukos,in urma unui decret prezidential din 1992, care pregatea, prin infiintarea de companii mai mici, privatizarea sectorului petrolier detinut de stat. Un moment foarte bun sa-ti tragi o bucata mare de cascaval. Pentru oligarhi, evident. Legal.
- decembrie 1995- Menatep, un grup financiar bancar, al carui co-fondator este Khodorkovsky, cumpara pachetul majoritar, 78%, in valoare de 5 miliarde cu doar…310 milioane USD. Khodorkovsky devine CEO, evident. Cat se poate de legal. Cam ca la noi, cu legi dedicate.
Sa ne amintim acea perioada, lipsa acuta de bani a guvernelor (s-a profitat la maxim, aruncand praf in ochi cu „privatizarea” care aduce bani la buget, da..dar extrem de putini), multe companii de stat din sectoare vitale , dar prost administrate de stat, scoase la vanzare , o evolutie similara am avut si in Romania, Ucraina. Un chilipir pentru cei „conectati”, dar si cu capital de cheltuit. Sectorul petrolier era perla coroanei.
In paranteza fie spus se putea si fara nu stiu ce capital, Patriciu fiind cel mai bun exemplu. Imi aduce aminte de aerele de mare om de afaceri, aroganta lui cand spunea ca orice prost stie sa faca afaceri cand are bani, spilul este sa faci afaceri fara bani. Am vazut apoi cat de iscusit a fost, cu bani lui, cand si-a pierdut „conexiunile”.
- Khodorkovsky pune compania pe picioare, trece pe profit, ajungand sa extraga 20% din petrolul rusesc, sau 2% din petrolul mondial. Nu e de colea, nu? Viitorul era teoretic roz, urma sa aiba loc o fuziune cu Sibneft( a 5–a mare companie ruseasca din domeniul petrolier), rezultand o companie mamut, a 4-a ca marime in lume( dupa BP, Exxon si Shell). Cu un Khodorokvsky putred de bogat, 15 miliarde USD, locul 16 in lume
Devine insa o potentiala prada, cu atat mai mult cu cat „seful” ei era pro-occidental. Si probabil ca nu „cotiza” unde trebuie. Cu atat mai mult cu cat Putin, un fost colonel KGB-ist, vine la putere in 1999. Un Putin expert in manipularea si aburirea „maselor”, numai bun sa se ia de gat cu oligarhii, spre mumtumirea poporului, satul de saracia lucie a anilor `90. Putin, un fel de „statul sunt eu” sovietic.
- 2002 Yukos este cotata ca fiind in top ten companii, dupa capitalizare, la nivel mondial.
- 2003, compania are peste 100.000 de angajati, 6 rafinarii si o valoare de piata de cca 33 miliarde USD.
- iulie 2013-Rusia incepe o „investigatie criminala” privitor la actiunile Yukos, hartuirea companiei, inclusiv amenintarea cu retragerea licentelor de exploatare.
- iulie-octombrie- sunt arestati doi „grei” ai companiei: Lebedev, condamnat la noua ani inchisoare in 2005 si Vasily Shakhovsky.
- octombrie 2003-Khodorkovsky este arestat, sub acuzatia de frauda si evaziune fiscala. Este condamnat la noua ani inchisoare in 2005. Alti executivi fug din tara, de frica. Printre ei si Leonid Nevzlin, membru in boardul Yukos.
- aprilie 2004- i se imputa 27 de miliarde USD, mult mai mult ca averea intreaga detinuta de el, si mai mult ca incasarile companiei din 2002 si 2003. Avocatilor li se pun la dispozitie cele 342 de dosare care argumenteaza frauda cu doar cateva ore inainte de proces.
- iulie 2004- Yuganskneftegaz, compania de baza a grupului , evaluata la cca 20 miliarde este confiscata de stat. Care refuza toate variantele propuse de Yukos, intentia vadita fiind aceea de a falimenta compania, si nu de a recupera „datoria”.
- decembrie 2004- Yuganskneftegaz este vanduta pe 9,5 milarde USD unei companii fantoma, infiintata cu cateva zile inainte de „licitatie”, evident una cu usile inchise. Comapnia fantoma, castigatoarea „licitatiei” se numea Baikalfinansgrup si era finantata de…compania de stat ruseasca Rosneft. Altfel spus statul confisca o propretate si si-o vinde apoi tot lui. Au ales 9,5 miliarde USD nu in urma unor calcule savante, valoarea activului net, sa zicem, ci pentru ca era mai putin ca datoria Yukos catre stat, putea fi oricat, atunci cand esti si vanzator si cumparator, in acelasi timp.
- noiembrie 2004- trei companii membre ale Yukos, inmaneaza presedintelui Putin o notificare privind incalcarea ECT, solicitand rezolvarea amiabila a disputei, conform art 26 (1) adin ECT.
- februarie 2005- trecand cele 3 luni de raspuns privind rezolvarea amiabila, conform art 26 (2) din ECT cele trei companii (Hulley,YUL si VPL, companii inregistrate in Cipru si Isle of Man, asa cum ii sta bine unui actionar rus care se respecta ) detinad pachetul de conrtol la OAO Yukos Oil Company (Yukos) astfel: 56.3% Hulley, YUL 2,6% si VPL 11.6% actioneaza solictand arbitrajul PCA si daune de 114 miliarde USD
Incepe procesul care va dura 10 ani, mii e pagini de dovezi si stenograme ale dezbaterilor. Costurile sunt de ordinul a zeci de milioane de dolari.
Se formeaza tribunalul compus din 3 judecatori, unul numit de reclamant (Dr. Charles Poncet) altul de reclamat (Stephen M. Schwebel) si ultimul, Chairmanul, cu acordul secretariatului general al PCA (The Hon. L. Yves Fortier PC CC OQ QC
- august 2005 –partile sunt de acord cu componenta tribunalului
- octombrie 2005- reclamatul, (Rusia) respinge jurisdictia tribunalului asupra spetei in cauza, precum si sustinerile reclamantului (Yukos) cum ca expropiereea este unfair si ilegala.
- octombrie 2005 –incep audierile. Procesul continua pana in 2014, luand in considerar inclusiv evolutia procesului de la ECtHR, sau eliberarea lui Khodorkovsky.
- 2006-Yukos este declarata in faliment
- februarie 2007-noi acuzatii sunt aduse lui Khodorkovsky si Lebedev, creste pedeapsa.
- 2007-Yukos este lichidata.
- iunie 2014-tribunalul emite ordinul procedural nr 18, prin care declara sentinta confidentiala timp de 10 zile de la trimiterea ei, electronic, partilor implicate, dupa care o va publica pe site-ul institutiei.
- 18 iulie 2014, este data sentinta, ulterior fiind publicata, dupa trecerea celor 10 zile.
Sentinta si motivarea ei se intind pe cca 600 de pagini, am sa incerc sa sintetizez doar ce e mai important. Oricum va fi un articol lung.
In anii `90 in Rusia apare un program de sustinere, prin taxe mici, regionale, un fel de regiuni defavorizate de la noi. Aceste regiui erau: Lesnoy , Trekhgorniy (acestea fiind cunoscute ca ZATO), Mordovia, Kalmykia si Evenkia. Iata ce zice PCA
„76. With respect to the tax benefits available in the ZATOs (Lesnoy and Trekhgorniy), in 1999, the
ZATOs were permitted to exempt taxpayers fully from federal corporate profit tax. In 2000,
most ZATOs were permitted to exempt taxpayers from the portion of the federal corporate
profit tax that was payable to their budget (e.g., up to 19 percent). In 2001, all ZATOs were
permitted to exempt taxpayers from the portion of the federal corporate profit tax that was
payable to their budget (e.g., also up to 19 percent). In 2002, however, these exemptions were
77. With respect to the tax benefits available in other low-tax regions, in 2000 and 2001, Mordovia,
Kalmykia and Evenkia were permitted to exempt taxpayers fully from the portion of the federal
corporate profit tax that was payable to their budget (e.g., from up to 19 percent to zero
percent). From 1 July 2002 until 31 December 2003, low-tax regions were permitted to exempt
taxpayers from the portion of the federal corporate profit tax payable to their budget, but only
up to four percent. An exception existed for ‘grandfathered’ tax investment agreements entered
into prior to 1 July 2001, such that these taxpayers could still receive a zero percent profit tax
rate if they fulfilled certain other conditions. As of 1 January 2004, the existing tax investment
agreements were terminated, but the Tax Code of the Russian Federation (the “Russian Tax
Code”) still allowed low-tax regions to reduce the federal corporate profit tax payable to their
budget up to four percent.”
Aici e de fapt chichirezul acuzarii, Rusia invocand faptul ca Yukos si-a mutat formal afacerile in aceste regiuni cu taxare redusa, dar fara a produce beneficii zonelor respective. Altfel spus Yukos extragea petrol pe care-l vindea la preturi foarte mici unor companii, subsidiare de fapt, inregistrate in aceste zone defavorizate, care la randul lor il revindeau clientilor finali, la pretul pietei, profitul net fiind astfel mai mare, prin taxarea inferioara aferanta acestor zone. Transfer pricing in beneficiul unor offshor-uri, sifonand astfel sute de milioane de dolari. Nimic nou sub soare, stim schema asta si din Romania.
Bun, dar de aici pana la 27 de miliarde e cale lunga, nu?
Yukos spune ca a respectat legea in vigoare pe teritoriul Rusiei, interpretarea autoritatilor fiind abuziva, in special datorita faptului ca fost singura companie careia i s-a aplicat aceasta interpretare – probail ca ceilalti cotizau unde trebuie.
In 2003, dupa abrogarea legislatiei de stimulare a afcerilor in zonele defavorizate, incepe hartuirea companiei, a carui conducator, „intamplator”, facea parte din opozitia politica, extrem de critica la adresa lui Putin.
De notat ca in 28 aprilie 2003 Ministrul Finantelor ordona un audit pe anii 2000 si 2001, care scoate basma curata compania Yukos. Ba mai mult, in toamna anului 2003 confirma ca Yukos nu are datorii catre stat.
In 8 decembrie 2013 se ordona un re-audit, rezultand acum o datorie de 3,5 miliarde pe anul 2000, 4,1 miliarde pe 2001, 6,8 miliarde pe 2002 si 6,1 miliarde pe 2003. Adica o datorie totala de peste 24 miliarde, din care o buna parte sunt penalitati.
Nu te pui cu fiscul, nu? Si nici cu „justitia” lui Putin. Conturile sunt inghetate, activele sechestrate. In 2004 Yukos incearca sa plateasca o parte din „datorie” dar este refuzata, ba i se aplica si o majorare de intarziere de 240 milioane, un fleac.
Guvernul rus solicita evaluarea „perlei coroanei”, a Yuganskneftegaz (YNG), pe care vrea sa o vanda , ca sa recupereze paguba.
ZAO Dresdner Bank evalueaza YNG intre 15,7 si 18,3 miliarde USD, JP Morgan, la solicitare Yukos, intre 16 si 22 milarde USD. Oricum nu mai putin de 15,7. Ministrul de justitie anunta insa ca YNG nu valoreaza mai mult de 10,4 miliarde. Pe 19 decembrie 2004 YNG este „vanduta” cu 9,37 miliarde USD. Unei companii infiintate cu cateva zile inainte si apoi „cumparata” de o compaie se stat ruseasca, Rosneft. Curat rusesc.
In urma acestor abuzuri actionarii majoritari dau in judecata Rusia si castiga.
Au existat 4 aspecte principale :
1.Privitor la fenomenul evazionist iata ce zice PCA:
„1611. While there is ample evidence in the record that nearly all Russian oil companies also availed
themselves of such tax optimization arrangements which were permitted by law, there is no
evidence that the operations of those other oil companies, in any respect, breached the
legislation and abused the low tax regimes as the Tribunal has found Yukos did through the
sham-like nature of some elements of its operations in at least some of the low-tax regions
notably in the ZATOs of Lesnoy and Trekhgorny.
1612. The Tribunal also recalls its further findings, in Chapters VIII.A and VIII.B above, that this
abuse by Yukos in some of the low-tax regions occurred prior to the confrontation between
President Putin and Mr. Khodorkovsky in February 2003. At the February 2003 meeting,
President Putin said to Mr. Khodorkovsky that, henceforth, he would no longer receive any
protection from the Kremlin. Specifically, President Putin said to Mr. Khodorkovsky: “We
have already discussed it with you recently, that your company, for example, has had problems
with the payment of taxes.”
1613. This specific reference by President Putin to Yukos’ tax issues at the February 2003 meeting is
1614. While the Tribunal has concluded, on the basis of the totality of the evidence, that
Respondent’s tax assessments and tax collection efforts against Yukos were not aimed
primarily at the collection of taxes, but rather at bankrupting Yukos and facilitating the transfer
of its assets to the State, it cannot ignore that Yukos’ tax avoidance arrangements in some of
the low-tax regions made it possible for Respondent to invoke and rely on that conduct as a
justification of its actions against Mr. Khodorkovsky and Yukos.”
2. Privitor la transfer pricing:
„1619. The Tribunal accepts Claimants’ argument that it is incongruous for the Russian Federation to
complain in these proceedings about Yukos’ use of the treaty while never having invoked the
mechanisms available to it to trigger the review of such use by, for example, invoking the
information-sharing provisions of the treaty.
1620. At the same time, it seems clear to the Tribunal, on the facts, that Yukos’ operations under the
DTA were wholly conducted by Mr. Lebedev from Yukos’ established offices in Moscow, that
his “place of management” where he habitually concluded contracts relating to operations
under the Treaty was in Moscow, which of itself demonstrates that Yukos’ avoidance of
hundreds of millions of dollars in Russian taxes through the Cyprus-Russia DTA, was
questionable. Hulley appears to the Tribunal to have falsely declared on Cypriot withholding
tax forms that “income”—dividends from Yukos—“was not connected with activities carried
on in the Russian Federation” despite Mr. Lebedev’s activities in Moscow”
3. referitor la vanzarea YNG:
„1622. The Tribunal reiterates that the abusive use of some of the low-tax regions by Yukos including
its questionable use of the Cyprus-Russia DTA occurred prior to the February 2003 encounter
between President Putin and Mr. Khodorkovsky and thus prior to the plan formed by the
Russian Federation not simply to collect taxes from Yukos but to bankrupt the company and
transfer its assets to the State.
1625. The Tribunal agrees that, but for these actions of Yukos, it is reasonable to surmise that the
auction of YNG on 19 December 2004, the unlawful measure of Respondent that dealt as “fatal
blow” to the survival prospects of Yukos, could have resulted in a higher bid price than the
auction actually did.
1627. In addition, before concluding its analysis of this facet of Claimants’ conduct, the Tribunal
needs to contrast these actions of Yukos with a series of actions of Respondent before the YNG
auction which must have depreciated the auction price very significantly and thus served the
Russian Federation objective of acquiring the Yukos assets at a bargain price.
1628. Those actions of Respondent include:
The threat by Russia’s Ministry of Natural Resources to withdraw YNG’s operating
The massive tax liabilities imposed on YNG in October and December 2004
The statement by the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice that the
USD 10.4 billion valuation of YNG was “due to the high risk to a potential
The decision by Respondent to fix the date of the auction exactly one month after the
auction was announced, being the minimum length of the notice required under
The alleged pressure of Respondent on would be bidders from India and China not to
participate in the auction.
1629. In conclusion, the Tribunal finds that the actions of Yukos which may have depreciated the
auction price, do not constitute contributory fault as they did not contribute in a material way to
4. referitor la faliment:
1631. Moreover, in the view of the Tribunal, even if Yukos had paid off the A Loan, it represented
only a fraction of the claims against Yukos which could have been used to petition the company
into bankruptcy. In view of the larger circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that, even if the
A Loan had been paid, another ground for pushing Yukos into bankruptcy would not have been
„1634. In the view of the Tribunal, Claimants should pay a price for Yukos’ abuse of the low-tax
regions by some of its trading entities, including its questionable use of the Cyprus-Russia
DTA, which contributed in a material way to the prejudice which they subsequently suffered at
the hands of the Russian Federation.
1635. In considering the extent of the contribution of Claimants’ faults to their injury, the Tribunal
notes that the subsequent conduct of the Russian Federation, as the Tribunal has found, was
disproportionate and tantamount to expropriation of Claimants’ investment in Yukos.
Claimants’ damages were caused by the series of events starting with the arrest of Messrs.
Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, and the tax assessments, and culminating in the YNG auction,
which led to the bankruptcy and liquidation of Yukos. The Tribunal must now determine to
what extent and in what proportion Claimants’ and Yukos’ conduct prior to 2003, including
their questionable use of the Cyprus-Russia DTA, contributed so as to lessen the responsibility
1637. Having considered and weighed all the arguments which the Parties have presented to it in
respect of this issue the Tribunal, in the exercise of its wide discretion, finds that, as a result of
the material and significant mis-conduct by Claimants and by Yukos (which they controlled),
Claimants have contributed to the extent of 25 percent to the prejudice which they suffered as a
result of Respondent’s destruction of Yukos. The resulting apportionment of responsibility as
between Claimants and Respondent, namely 25 percent and 75 percent, is fair and reasonable in
the circumstances of the present case.”
Altfel spus 25% din pagubelece vor fi calculate ca fiind provocate de Rusia se datoreaza companiei Yukos.
Reclamantul solicita , asa cum a solicitat si Rusia, dobanda la banii pierduiti. Rusia refuza, fiecare cu argumetele lui. PCA face referire la ECT:
Article 13(1) of the ECT directs that compensation “shall also
include interest at a commercial rate established on a market basis from the date of
Expropriation until the date of payment”
1677. As we saw earlier, the ECT, the relevant legal instrument, envisages an award of interest in an
arbitral award. In addition, the Treaty decrees mandatory payment of interest “at a commercial
rate established on a market basis” in the case of a lawful arbitration. In the view of the
Tribunal, there can be no doubt that, a fortiori, in the case of an unlawful expropriation, as in
the present case, Claimants are entitled to interest from Respondent in order to ensure full
reparation for the injury they suffered as a result of those of Respondent’s measures that the
Tribunal has found to be internationally wrongful.
1685. The Tribunal, in the exercise of its discretion, has concluded that it would be appropriate to
award to Claimants interest on a rate based on ten-year U.S. Treasury bond rates.”
In final se calculeaza, prin varii metode paguba produsa. Fiecare parte isi sustine punctul de vedere, aduce experti etc. Se face referire inclusiv la data la care se evalueaza compania. Treaba incalcita, nu degeaba a durat 10 ani. Este utilzat la greu ECT, de unde Rusia s-a retras, dar prea tarziu.
„1782. As set out earlier in this chapter, for purposes of the damages calculation, the Tribunal has
decided that the relevant valuation dates are the date of the YNG auction and the date of this
Sunt prezentate apoi cele 8 valori rezultate prin metode diferite: intre 74 si 129 miliarde.
1826. The total amount of Claimants’ damages based on a valuation date of 19 December 2004 is
USD 21.988 billion, whereas the total amount of their damages based on a valuation date of
30 June 2014 is USD 66.694 billion. Since the Tribunal has concluded earlier that Claimants
are entitled to the higher of these two amounts, the total amount of damages to be awarded
before taking into account any deductions necessary as a consequence of Claimants’
contributory fault is USD 66.694 billion.”
Din care se scad 25%, vina companiei, ramand de plata vreo 50 de miliarde. Vor plati oare? Nu cred. Dar palma peste obraz au primit-o. Sunt vinovati, condamnati inclusiv de judecatorul ales de ei.
In final avem si un calcul de costuri cu judecata. Foarte interesant:
-reclamantul cheltuieste aproape 30 de milioane in faza 1 de judecata, apoi inca vreo 50 de milioane in faza 2.
Foloseste peste 20 de avocati, platiti cu 23 milioane in faza1 si 40 de milioane in faza 2.
Expertii sunt platiti cu sume uneori trecand peste 1 milion USD.
In final te intrebi: doar Putin este de vina? De ce spune Khodorkovsky ca „Russia and Putin’s regime could not be two more different things.”? Vinovat este si el , 25% din paguba este din vina companiei condusa de el.
Vinovati sunt si toti trepadusii slugarnici din administratia si justitia rusa, vinovati sunt , in fond, si rusii, care aplauda nationalizarea unei companii profitabile, cu 100,000 de angajati, in folosul evident al noii nomenklaturi rosii de la Kremlin.
Este putin probabil sa plateasca macar o copeica, dar faptul ca justitia europeana functioneaza, chiar daca sunt cazuri extrem de complexe, ne da speranta ca adevarul invinge intr-un final, ca Putin, cat o fi el de abil si viclean, nu poate prosti chiar pe toata lumea.
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