joi, iunie 13, 2024

Standing Up to the Bully in the Backyard

The Russian aggression in Ukraine has exposed the Western Alliance to the hard evidence of a grim reality: Moscow is willing to break the fabric of the post-Cold War order to advance an imperialist agenda in the East, challenging NATO at its borders.

What Russia is doing right now in Ukraine is more than mere brinksmanship or muscle flexing. It aims at sustainably reversing the developments of the past two and a half decades, which sought to bring democracy, prosperity and stability in Eastern Europe. This is beyond doubt the most significant test for NATO since the end of the Cold War, and one to which the Alliance must respond swiftly and credibly in order to retain its relevance and continue to serve as a security anchor for Western values.

Alas, Allied response to Russia’s brazen actions in the East has revealed a number of critical weaknesses in NATO’s military posture, political resolve and resulting preparedness to build a credible deterrence strategy against the threat posed by Russia.

First among these is the structural imbalance of military assets, a legacy of the Cold War and one that has been left unaddressed since. The US is still the preponderant military force within NATO. European Allies have done little if anything to offset America’s retreat of conventional forces from Europe, whereas new member states in the East, with the emerging notable exception of Poland, do not possess the economic muscle to finance significant new military assets.

This state of affairs has the upshot of leaving NATO’s Eastern flank vulnerable to a conventional military aggression. The Baltics are the most acute expression of this, but other states, including my country, Romania, are also exposed.

On the political side, NATO has been afflicted by the simultaneous effect of the US pivot to Asia and the lack of political leadership in Europe, where Germany still dithers when it comes to assuming its role as a full-fledged regional power. Revelations of NSA eavesdropping on European leaders have done little to boost confidence in the transatlantic dialogue. Building a credible response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine required a degree of transatlantic cohesion that simply was not there, and could not be built overnight.

When events in Ukraine escalated, it was as if Russia had served the Allies dinner, whereas they were still busy washing up the dishes after lunch. NATO’s lack of preparedness and contingency planning for Russia’s assertiveness was apparent in the response of leaders from both sides of the Pond. Slow to react in the first place, Western leaders then moved to erect a barrage of words that did not match up with concrete actions. This, to Russia, looked a lot like weakness, serving to both vindicate Putin’s bold moves and to encourage further escalation. For NATO, this was the best response they could put up. As it turns up, it was not nearly good enough.

What now? With Eastern Ukraine on the verge of disaster, and rising alarm as to the security of the Baltics, NATO must move swiftly to make up for lost time. Ahead of the Summit in Wales, Western leaders need to address an impending threat, while rushing to draw the blueprint for the future of the Alliance. To do this, the Allies need to center their response on the urgent need to enhance political and military credibility. In what follows, I will sketch a set of recommendations that NATO Members could use to resuscitate NATO and secure the future of the Alliance.

1)      Go back to the fundamentals and sign a new Charter of Values. Western military cooperation was about defending values before it was about building military assets. When the solidarity of the Allies comes under stress, it is fundamental for them to remember why they came together in the first place. Signing a new Charter of Values, including a strong pledge to enforcing Article V, may serve as a public reminder of what the Alliance stands for, increasing its legitimacy, reassuring more exposed/new member states such as Poland and the Baltics, and showing challengers that the transatlantic bond is still strong.

2)      Develop and stick to a roadmap for a more sustainable burden sharing among Allies. For too long now, the US has provided for the bulk of spending on assets and capabilities. It is time for all Member States alike to step up and jointly commit to a calendar of boosting defense spending up to 2% of their GDP. European members should also develop a structured dialogue for finally making operational a program to avoid needless asset duplication.

3)      Strengthen the Eastern flank. The Alliance needs to make clear that it won’t put up with the new aggressive posture of Russia. Strengthening the Eastern flank by relocating assets and capabilities in key countries such as Poland, the Baltics, Bulgaria and Romania needs to be a priority in the short to medium term. So is developing a plan for holding joint military exercises with Member States in the East and making it clear that Allies are engaged in contingency planning for a potential further deterioration of the security situation in Eastern Europe. As the Cold War has amply shown, building up a strong deterrent is probably the best way of ensuring durable peace.

4)      Keep the door open. NATO is not and should not develop into a fortress. Countries that share the same values and are willing to shoulder the burden of collective defense should be allowed to have a membership perspective.

5)      Get Germany to sign up to a role that matches its economic weight. A more substantial engagement of Germany with NATO is long overdue. Of late, some Berlin leaders have indicated Berlin may be inclined to take up a more active role in the Alliance. This is welcome, and should be encouraged by European allies and the US alike.

Until very recently, conventional thinking regarding NATO’s future role revolved around the mantra “Out of Area or Out of Business.” While the Alliance was grappling with the challenge of finding a new role for itself in a changing global environment, longstanding but dormant threats slipped under NATO’s radar. The Allies were keen to view Russia as a partner rather than a foe, and this in spite of repeated warnings that Moscow was not content with playing second fiddle to NATO’s agenda. The result was that, to Russia’s eyes, NATO appeared as a weak and increasingly irrelevant relic that reflected Western nations’ relegation of hard power to the footnotes of history.

Now, the Allies need to make a U-turn in strategic thinking and wake up to the realization that, to keep the guns silent, they must hold their finger on the trigger. Building a credible deterrence in the East may turn out to be the real litmus test for NATO’s contemporary relevance.

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  1. „Get Germany to sign up to a role that matches its economic weight” – you are not alone in thinking this, however you all seem to be forgetting why this is not happening. Maybe when you will understand why not the geeks are the role models in high school you will understand why Germany cannot be a military leader in the near future. And no, it does not have to do with Germany.

    • De acord, masura in care Germania, cu tot bagajul istoric si prezentul voit ne-carismatic, poate fi un model de leadership militar in NATO, e o intrebare legitima. Cel mai probabil, daca si cand se va ajunge acolo, Berlinul va milita pentru o adancire a cooperarii militare la nivel european, adica exact ce voia Blair in 1999 la St Malo. Insa asta e doar la nivel de speculatie. Pana atunci, problema e ca la Berlin nu exista un consens politic fata de raportarea la Alianta. Ai vazut declaratiile lui Schulz, care nu au nicio legatura cu ce a zis Joachim Gauck la Conferinta de la Munich. Aceasta sciziune se reflecta si la nivelul opiniei publice – 50% din populatie este impotriva unei implicari mai mari a NATO in Europa de est, de exemplu. Si pana cand Germania nu se va implica pe deplin in NATO, Alianta va juca in Europa cu o mana legata la spate.

    • All NATO plans up to 1989 provided for West Germany as the linchpin of a defensive strategy, given the length of its borders and direct exposure to a Warsaw Pact attack, At the time, most scenarios were turning around a massive armored thrust from the East, which the Western Germans and allies were supposed to delay if not contain. Although present conditions are far removed from the script of the ‘Eastern Hordes’ crossing the Elbe en masse, I am sure that Germany does retain credible military capabilities. As to why it would be reluctant to flex its muscles, I believe that is self-explanatory. Most likely, all Russian plans play upon a low intensity conflict scenario- but then again, history has proven time and again that it is next to impossible to control the scale of warfare. It may be just wishful thinking on my part but I doubt there will be a full fledged war (but then again, this was ‘common knowledge’ in 1914). The question though is who among the Western countries has retained a stomach for a fight. Kossovo was mostly a Nintendo war, fought from the air and benefitting from overwhelming odds. I cannot but remember the shameful episode of the Dutch unit in Srebrenica, letting itself be disarmed and manacled to a bridge rail.

  2. The reality is that NATO is loosing its importance in the eyes
    of many people from its component member states. The results of the NATO
    and other alies actions from Irak and Afghanistan (in my opinion
    there have been partial results in Afghanistan with flushing out
    radical islamists from there and eventually leading to capturing Ossama
    bin Laden) are seen as inconclusive and at a cost of significant human
    loses. The result is seen as consisting of corrupt governments and
    not necessarily the removal of radical islamists (in Irak actually
    the presence of Al-Qaeda was growing significantly since
    USA and NATO intervention).

    Moreover, there was the economical crisis, which almost unexpectedly
    started in 2008 and from which only recently Western economies started recovering.
    Perhaps this is the main reason for cutting millitary budgets, besides
    the perception of lack of military threats, in most NATO countries.
    This can be observed in the strong reluctance to impose economic
    sanctions on Russia by countries which have been hit by the economical
    crisis but do not depend on Russian oil or gas. Spain is such an example.

    Military cuts occured in the USA army as well, despite a strong political support
    for a strong army. Backed by strong research programs such as DARPA
    leading to innovations which day by day get the technology closer
    to that only imagined in Star Wars, USA is leading in all military areas
    when taking into account their latest advances in human wearable
    devices, robotics, aviation (F35 and F22), underwater sensing and so on.
    The difference between USA and Russia in conventional weaponry
    is huge and the recent classification of Rusia as „a weak regional
    power” by Obama is not far from truth. However, not the same can be
    said about the other countries members of NATO. With very few exceptions
    their armies depend entirely on USA. Perhaps this is the time for USA
    to entice these countries to increase their military spending according
    to their NATO pledges (military budgets of 2% from GDP). This should be
    not reduced to buying second hand American military equipment
    30-40 years old, but also developping new technical capabilities perhaps
    through targeted research programes.

    Even though military is important, since military intervention against
    Russia is excluded, the Western nations should impose
    imediate and serious economic sanctions. First of all they should
    not sell weapons or technical equipment with dual use to Russia.
    For example France has currently a deal to sell Russia two advanced
    Mistral landing ships, which resemble a carrier, able to carry hundrends
    of solders, tanks, armored cars and at least 8 helicopters each.
    This idea of this deal was borned in the heat of the Russian intervention
    in Georgia in 2008, when Sarkozy hurried up to the region, in order to act
    as a „mediator”.
    Based on his observation that Russian troups landing in Georgia were
    not that effective and that their equipment was technologically old, he suggested
    the deal to the Russians perhaps thinking of economical benefits for France.
    This deal fully materialized in 2010 be signature at the highest level
    in Russia and France. This deal is now fiercely defended by the current
    French government of Hollande. Such examples can continue with other
    army deals by NATO countries with Russia.

    Even more significant is the European dependence on Russian gas
    and the reluctance to change this situation. European countries must
    immediately diversify their energy sources using resources from Norway
    and Northen Africa.
    Moreover, LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) terminals must be built everywhere,
    and particularly where they are missing (Eastern and Central Europe).
    Unscientific and unjustified restrictions to shale-gas exploation in France
    and to the nuclear power in Germany should be immediately eased.
    Moreover, USA should allow massive LNG gas export towards Europe in order to replace
    Russian sources. Europe must also realize that renewable energy sources
    cannot entirely replace other sources of energy in the short term and that
    using Russian oil and gas is unethical and not moral for the civilized world.
    Europe should go even further and completly cancel the South Stream pipe
    (which is supposed to bring gas from Russia to Bulgaria under the Black Sea)
    and send serious warnings to the European companies involved in
    the project, such as the Italian oil company ENI, but also to the Bulgarians
    who are very keen on this project. Yesterday (see Bloomberg news o 18/04/2014),
    the Anglo-Dutch oil company Shell signed a deal, approved
    personally by Putin, for startng massive gas exploitation in the Eastern
    Siberia. In order to evidentiate the hypocrisy of companies such as
    Shell, let us not forget that this company backed financially and
    morally Ukraine in their trial at Strasbourg with Romania about splitting
    the Black Sea continental shelf.

    With respect to finance, any investments in Russia must have a high
    cost. This is evidentiated by the increase of CDS (credit default
    swaps) to 2.66 points, which represent the risk and implicitly
    `the cost` of investing in Russia.
    However, this is not that much, and governments should warn any potential
    investors about the risk of investing in Russia, as president Obama
    did on Thursday. Even Putin, by declaring that assets of Western
    companies from Russia may be confiscated if economic sanctions
    are imposed on Russia, „supports” such sanctions by showing contempt
    to foreign inestment. There is no stronger statement about the
    lack of security for investments in Russia than this.

    The uncertainity of Russia’s future policies, involving military
    activity, stepping over lands of suveran states leading to wars, not
    respecting signed treaties, bullying their neighbours small or big,
    saying something while doing something else, lying all the time
    against the evidence, requires a strong reply from everybody
    able to inflict high costs on Russia.
    These actions by Russia apparently started in modern times in 2008
    with Georgia (Transnistria was the theater of such an intervention
    by Russia in 1992), but they actually correspond to a long term bad
    behaviour stretching back to communist soviet times and to tzarist Russia,
    which civilized nationes thought of as being gone. The entire NATO should strengthen
    their armies, and its component countries impose immediate and
    widespread economic and financial sanctions on Russia.
    The Western civilization should be more consistent with their
    long term values and impose costs. Any such economic and financial sanctions
    will produce a far higher cost on Russia than on their own Western economies.
    Russia, instead of „protesting” and threatening with contra-measures
    of their own, should rather meditate about the reasons of such sanctions,
    on their own behaviour. They should adapt to the modern times and seek
    increasing their influence in the world through other means such as exerting
    cultural and soft power and should not resort to military means or to
    bully those countries perceived as weaker. Only if the can learn something
    from the history.

    • Adam, thanks for your detailed and thoughtful comments. I have just two remarks here. First, yes, Iraq and Afghanistan were both controversial in certain circles (although as you know the 2003 operation was not NATO-led, the Alliance being involved only in post-conflict tasks). The operations happened during a period when NATO no longer had an immediate regional threat to its members, and switched to addressing perceived dangers to international security, i.e. terrorism and rogue states. I am not sure whether they contributed to weakening the Alliance, although during the early 2000s there certainly was a marked schism, caused by a combination of factors that include George W. Bush’s penchant for an excentric ideology, the Europeans newfound confidence (the Euro, St Malo et al.) and the diminishing of the Russian threat (we are talking of Putin’s first mandate).
      Second, even before the crisis there had been substantial asymmetry with regard to Allies military spending. Together, all European NATO states spent less than half of what the US did on the military. And even this figure is misleading with regard to the Europeans’ real capabilities, as their expenses went into unneeded asset duplication.

    • ” The uncertainity of Russia’s future policies, involving military
      activity, stepping over lands of suveran states leading to wars, not
      respecting signed treaties, bullying their neighbours small or big,
      saying something while doing something else, lying all the time
      against the evidence, requires a strong reply from everybody
      able to inflict high costs on Russia.”

      Avem aici o descriere perfecta a comportamentului si mentalitatii rusesti post-KGB , si in acelasi timp o prezentare a provocarii la care trebuie sa faca fata UE si Occidentul , dar accesibila, din pacate , numai celor care cunosc limba engleza.

      • Comentariul meu este in engleză deorece blogul inițial a fost în engleză.
        Apoi, comentariul meu, critic la adresa aliaților europeni ar fi de mai puțin
        interes pentru audiența din România și de msi mare interes pentru cineva din
        restul Europei/internațional. De bine de rău în România știm la ce să ne așteptăm
        de la ruși, deși după cum vedeți polonezii dunt mult mai activi pe `frontul
        diplomatic`, dar au și suferit mult mai mult decât noi.

        Aș merge mai departe cu observațiile despre acțiuniler rușilor din Ucraina
        și a menționa că la fel ca și cele din Georgia din 2008 se aseamană cu modul de acțiune
        al expasiunii musulmane din sec. VII-VIII și a invaziilor mongolilor, în faza lor incipientă,
        în sec. XIII. Cu diferența față de `implementarea Stalin` că Putin pare să urmărească
        reducerea numărului de victime, sau cel puțin sa se justifice în acest fel în acțiunile sale.
        Un exemplu tipic militar mongol a fost fondarea diviziei Tudor Vladimirescu în WWII din
        prizonierii români care a fost apoi trimisă să lupte în linia I contra Armatei Române …
        tipic mongol și nu veți întâlni așa ceva la nicio altă armată.

        Astfel de acțiuni, de natură necovențională ar trebui studiate, analizate și
        contracarate în academiile militare ale NATO unde se vorbește prea mult
        despre WWII și razboiul de tranșee. Vedeți câte probleme are și va avea
        Ucraina și bănuiec căștiți sau puteți afla ușor unde au dus invaziile menționate de mine
        mai sus. Ca să întelegem astfel de adpecte ale războiului asimetric, va trebui
        să stufiem mai bine anumite evenimente din trecut care sunt trecute prea ușor
        cu vederea.

  3. I don’t think NATO’s reaction was at all inadequate given the circumstances.
    Ukraine is not a member of NATO and it wasn’t even in talks to become one so there is no treaty or even moral obligation for NATO to intervene even if Russia would have started (or would start) a full scale invasion and annexation of all or part of Ukraine. There is no need to „reaffirm” the values and articles, the willingness of NATO to enforce Article 5 was not tested and found wanting.
    You posit that NATO’s reaction is seen as weakness by Russia. I’m not sure what Russia (or Putin) thinks (who is?) but if they really believe NATO is weak then they are very deluded.
    It is true that militarily Russia looks a lot better now than in the times of Yeltsin but the qualitative superiority between NATO and Russia is still very wide (and getting wider) and the Russian military knows it. A „confrontation” with NATO would be very painful for an army whose last „victory” was against Georgia and any humiliating „incidents” may change the mood of ordinary Russians that are now firmly behind Czar Vladimir.
    I also do not agree with point 4. NATO is a collective security alliance. Values do play some part but they’re not „core” to the treaty. See Turkey today, not exactly a cradle of democracy and liberalism. Expansion of NATO should (and will) first look to the strategic position of a candidate country and of its neighbourhood. And as for the „willing to share the burden” bit, I refer you to your point 2 (with which I agree but on which I don’t think we’ll see much change in the next few years).
    As for Germany, I’m ambivalent. Since the 1860’s the elephant in the European room has been Germany. I’m not sure the Germans will want to become a military leader and I’m not sure the US or Britain would acquiesce in that. NATO’s purpose was not only to oppose the Soviets but also to persuade Germany that it does not need a very strong military or its own nuclear arsenal. Which may be another reason why the US will not really push for increased defence spending from those Europeans that can afford it and from whom the value would make a difference (which would mainly be… Germany).

    • Adam, thanks for your very interesting remarks. First, a quick point of clarification – I am not arguing that NATO should have intervened militarily to counter Russia in Ukraine. But putting up a swift, coordinated and credible response would have been a good expression of robustness and solidarity.

      Also, we should not rush to conflate the sum of military capabilities of member states with the strength of the Alliance as a whole. NATO’s credibility is a factor of the political cohesion and military preparadness of its members.

      With regard to the point you made with regard to values, I would argue that NATO is a norms-based organization. This has a threefold meaning: that it was built to defend liberal democracies, that its members are held to standards of governance and thar it stands for a system of international norms. You made a very good point with regard to Turkey, but that is rather the exception than the rule, don’t you think? Further, and perhaps even more importantly, rules and norms is the one thing that sets NATO aside from Russia. Strengthening the commitment to its core values could bolster its legitimacy while helping to reaffirm this important side of the Alliance.

      Re Germany – I see your point here. History matters, and as you said, NATO was created to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. But that needs to change. We cannot keep referring back to 1860. The fact that Germany is the natural hegemon in Europe (and I fully agree with that) does not in and of itself mean that Germany is to be contained. In fact, you know all too well what France’s Post WWI containment strategy did to Germany and how it contributed to the rise of Hitler.

  4. Noul razboi total impotriva democratiei si Occidentului.

    Din nefericire, articolul nu trece dincolo de constatari empirice si cvasi-tautologice de genul :

    /.. Moscow is willing to break the fabric of the post-Cold War order to advance an imperialist agenda in the East, challenging NATO at its borders. /

    / What Russia is doing right now in Ukraine is more than mere brinksmanship or muscle flexing. It aims at sustainably reversing the developments of the past two and a half decades, which sought to bring democracy, prosperity and stability in Eastern Europe. /,etc.

    De fapt, la fel ca si scriitorul Pavel Corut in *Adevarul* ( ) , autorul ofera doar recomandari pentru membrii NATO , dar fara o analiza de profunzime a cauzelor care au condus la situatia actuala si fara o analiza a mentalitatii rusesti , de neinteles in acest caz pentru o mentalitate democratica si occidentala. Pana la urma, la fel ca si in cazul Georgiei, agresiunea contra Ucrainei si de fapt impotriva UE si Occidentului , este numai in subsidiar una militara.
    Pe de alta parte, situatia in care se afla acum si UE si NATO luate total prin surprindere ( inca o data dupa precedentul Georgiei ) de agresiunea ruseasca brutala in Ucraina, seamana cu situatia creata in vara trecuta prin tentativa de lovitura de stat din Romania care a bulversat nu numai romanii, ci si UE si USA . Ambele agresiuni au actionat intr-o zona aflata in afara grilelor UE si a grilei democratice in general.
    Diferenta este ca actiunea SF cu mascati si trupe fara insemne din Ucraina , nu este decat primul pas dintr-un scenariu complex al razboiului total, informational, psihologic si geopolitic ( inclusiv in spatiul virtual si dincolo de ”Matrix” ) , razboi in care au fost analizate si exploatate la scara globala toate caracteristicile si fisurile mentalitatii si democratiei occidentale care a facut gresala sa subestimeze ravagiile mentalitatii post-kaghebiste si dughiniste intr-o Rusie acaparata de siloviki . Rezultatul de cosmar este o tara care geografic apartine Europei , dar care isi antreneaza copiii si fetitele de 12 ani cu pistoalele mitraliera si „pentru viitor” .
    UE si Occidentul se afla acum in situatia de a cunoste pe viu proverbul romanesc ”pe cine nu lasi sa moara nu te lasa sa traiesti”. Mai exact ceea ce americanii au construit numai in fictiunile cinematografice , distopiile atemporale si scenariile catastrofice moderne, rusii au construit la alta scara si exact in realitatea acestei lumi.
    Este pretul platit de Occident pentru necondamnarea comunismului si nerecunoasterea crimelor lui care le-au depasit de fapt pe cele naziste.
    In acelasi timp este cea mai mare provocare existenta dupa 1945 pentru pentru civilizatia si democratia europeana si occidentala a carei aparitie a fost prevazuta doar de catre tarile din Est respectiv de disidentii si intelectualii lor care au cunoscut in mod nemijlocit mentalitatea si iadul comunist.

    In sfarsit , cele 5 masuri propuse de autor sunt necesare , dar nu si suficiente. Problema principala este in realitate razboiul total impotriva democratiei si Occidentului , razboi in care agresiunea militara reprezinta numai elementul final si nu neaparat necesar. De fapt, ceea ce lipseste in acest moment, este o strategie occidentala coerenta de contracare a razboiului informational total dus impotriva Occidentului si a valorilor lui , razboi care continua la un nivel infinit superior, si la scara globala , propaganda ruseasca anterioara momentului 1989. Din acest punct de vedere , spre deosebire de Occident, Rusia nu a pierdut nimic deoarece la nivel global si sub varii forme , mentalitatea anti-occidentala a castigat se pare cam toate bataliile.

    In mod cert, dupa invazia rusa din Crimeea, nimic nu mai seamana cu ceea ce a fost inainte pentru ca lumea in care traim nu mai este de fapt aceeasi . S-a schimbat nu numai echilibrul geopolitic si strategic, ci a fost pus sub semnul intrebarii intreg echilibrul civilizatiei europene si occidentale.

    P.S. In primul rand , este adevarat ca multi romani cunosc limba engleza , dar eticheta in general si respectul in special fata de cititorii acestei platforme in limba romana , ar presupune ca autorul roman sa-si scrie acest articol de interes public in romaneste sau cel putin sa scrie in subsidiar si traducerea lui cum s-a mai practicat de fapt pe acest forum chiar si in cazul autorilor englezi.

    • ei,ce scrietzi in PS tzine de educatzie !!ha ha
      comentariul dvs il apreciez cu mult fatza de ce scrie autorul,ce sa fac,tzine de engleza mea,ha ha

      • Domnule Simion,

        Multumesc pentru comentariile extrem de pertinente. Articolul nu s-a dorit o analiza comprehensiva a cauzalitatii istorice sau a psihologiei societatii ruse, domenii pe care cu siguranta dvs. le stapaniti mai bine decat subsemnatul, care are o instruire in domeniul relatiilor internationale. Am preferat, dat fiind caracterul comprimat al observatiilor, sa prezint sintetic si clar cateva argumente de baza, asumandu-mi riscul ca ele sa para evidente pentru unii observatori avizati, printre care in mod evident va numarati.

        In ceea ce priveste redactarea in limba engleza, recunosc ca este o formula neobisnuita pentru contributors, si regret sincer daca aceasta abordare a fost deranjanta pentru anumiti cititori. Tot ce pot spune este ca textul a fost redactat in limba engleza in original, intr-un context separat de demersul publicistic, aparitia lui ‘tel-quel’ fiind o decizie la baza pragmatica, insa care a tinut cont de faptul ca dezbaterea in sine depaseste granitele Romaniei, acest punct de vedere putand fi de interes si unor persoane care nu stapanesc limba romana. Va asigur, totusi, ca de indata ce timpul va permite voi transmite editorilor o traducere pentru a fi adaugata articolului.

        Inca o data multumiri pentru ampla si interesanta dvs. critica.


      • Lasati aprecierile , nu impresioneaza pe nimeni. Apropo, faptul ca scrieti „rromanica” in loc de Romania si luati in ras tot ce este romanesc, imi spune , si nu numai mie, cat de „la rasarit” va aflati de noi . Apropo , cu fair-play -ul si curajul care va caracterizeaza , cred ca nu ati uitat si urmatoarele ziceri curajoase ale dvs :

        „ …numele dvs nu poate fi si el un fals !? e un nick,eu asha il percep. motivele ptr care eu socotesc ca un nume,fie el real,nu poarta aceeashi responsabilitate in mediul virtual ca in cel real,ma determina sa ramin la dusu; ”

        Altfel spus, fiecare cu perceptiile lui :))

        • imi retrag aprecierile domnule Simion ,daca asta va deranjeaza
          vad ca ma monitorizatzi; va ajuta cu ceva?
          romanica este o fata virgina de care profita totzi.

          • Nu m-ati inteles, monitorizarea este de fapt una inversa :)) .
            Aprecierile nu ma mai deranjeaza si nu ma mai intereseaza de foarte multa vreme ( dar , probabil , la 20 de ani m-ar fi preocupat enorm …) .
            Altfel spus, nu este vorba de mine , este vorba de fair-play in general . Exemplu :

            ” romanica este o fata virgina de care profita totzi.” ( ??!!)

            Daca sunteti roman onest , nu ganditi si nu va exprimati asa, pentru ca stiti desigur ca nu toti romanii omoara, fura de la stat sau de la altii , si injura …
            Romanii traiesc in Romania ( si acesta este dreptul lor ) , altii traiesc in romanica ( este si acesta este dreptul lor) .

            Cu sinceritate, vedeti cate probleme sensibile poate atinge o singura generalizare gratuita ?

    • let’s be honest and look at the reality: Russia knew very well what would be EU’s reaction before starting the operations. Russia knew that big firms with strong business ties with Russia would lobby their Governments to soften their reactions (this happens as we speak before Monday’s Ministers’ meeting that should establish stronger countermeasures against Russia’s aggression). For Russia EU’s reaction (or better say: lack of reaction) was not a surprise at all, maybe just NATO’s (to read: USA’s) reaction could have been (and it remains and looks like it will be in the future) the ONLY obstacle against their aggressive operations.

      EU’s reaction is soft, ineffective, predictable, and watered down by the special/privileged German-Russian relation. Eastern EU member states (ie Poland, the three Baltic states and, probably, to a certain extent Romania) could be the only ones to push (not necessarily in a successful manner though) for a stronger position and more important/coordinated countermeasures. it is enough just to look at the current EU ”leaders”: is there anyone that could have the profile and personality to convince narrow minded, egoist and populist politicians in the member states for effective countermeasures? NOBODY!

      all these aspects and, for sure, many others are crystal clear for Russia. The only obstacle could be NATO (ie USA backed by some members). The problem is : what would NATO do if Russia invades Eastern Ukraine? what would NATO do if the Transdnister region would declare independence and integration in Russia? what if troops (so called ”unknown” para-troops) would show up in the Transdnister region in order to close the entire Black see coast (with Crimea, Odessa) ?

      Meanwhile, for sure the EU politicians would come up with nice political statements expressing their worries for the world’s peace and stability….Germany would not have to worry though because of their special gas pipeline that connects them directly to Russia’s bedroom. France can continue to sell their ships to the Russians. Italy’s ENI would call for limited countermeasures and continued discussions with the East. UK is too focused on the UKIP’s political war against immigrants … What a Europe?!?!


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Alexandru Coita
Alexandru Coita
Alexandru Coita este antreprenor și specalist in politică externă și securitate. A fost secretar de stat (tehnocrat) în guvernul Ungureanu și reprezentant al Camerei Deputaților pe lângă Uniunea Europeană. A susținut cu succes în 2015 teza doctorală cu tema riscurilor politice la adresa securității energetice a UE.

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