Pe 1 noiembrie 1956, in momentul inceperii celei de-a doua interventii militare sovietice, Ungaria era o tara libera. Fusesera restabilite drepturile omului si ale cetateanului. Fusesera restaurate doua valori esentiale: suveranitatea nationala si suveranitatea poporului. Marile intreprinderi deveneau cu adevarat proprietate sociala si se formau pretutindeni consilii muncitoresti.
Premierul Imre Nagy anunta sfarsitul monopolului politic al partidului comunist si revenirea la multipartidism. Monstruoasa politie politica AVH fusese desfiintata. Se nastea un nou partid care isi zicea „muncitoresc socialist”. Liderul acestei formatiuni, Janos Kadar, era un leninist impenitent, arestat si condamnat in timpul terorii rakosiste. A doua zi, in pofida declaratiilor sale de fidelitate pentru guvernul Nagy, Kadar fugea din Budapesta si forma, pe teritoriu sovietic, un „guvern” al tradarii.
Imre Nagy a condamnat vehement agresiunea, a vestejit sovinismul de mare putere al conducerii de la Kremlin si a proclamat iesirea Ungariei din Tratatul de la Varsovia. A dovedit curaj civic si noblete sufleteasca. I-a spus clar ambasadorului Iuri Andropov (da, acel Andropov!) ca Ungaria a ales neutralitatea. Imre Nagy a incetat sa mai plateasca tribut bolsevismului. A ales socialismul democratic, adversarul ireconciliabil al statului politienesc leninist.
Iată ce scria N. Steinhardt in “Jurnalul fericirii” despre Imre Nagy, o analiză rascolitoare a rupturii cu minciuna totalitară şi a curajului de a reabilita etica revoltei: “Mai este un caz pentru care cred că Hristos va lovi, al singurului comunist trecut printr-un proces de transfigurare şi ajuns la sfinţenie şi martiriu: Imre Nagy. Cât de liber suflă duhul şi ce neaşteptat işi alege sălaşurile: in sufletul unui activist mai intâi (şi ani mulţi) plin de zel stalinist… Inlăuntrul omului ăstuia…se petrece in interval de numai zece zile (timpul e limitat ca intr-o piesă clasică) prefacerea deplină. Nagy e la sfârşitul celor zece zile altul. Nu şi-a schimbat politica, şi-a schimbat sufletul”.
Iata un document cat se poate de revelator. Este limpede ca pentru Andropov, Nagy devenise un „renegat”. Iar pentru „renegati” nicio pedeapsa nu poate fi indeajuns de severa. A fost spanzurat, in urma unei inscenari judiciare, in iunie 1958.
Not to be copied
Today, on November 1, at 7 p.m. I received an invitation to the inner cabinet meeting of the Council of Ministers of the H[ungarian] P[eople’s] R[epublic]. Imre Nagy, who chaired the meeting, informed the participants in a rather nervous tone that in the morning he had addressed the Soviet Ambassador in connection with the Soviet troops crossing the Hungarian border and advancing towards the heart of the country. Nagy „demanded” an explanation in that matter. The way Nagy said all this suggested that he expected me to affirm that he had really expressed his protests to me. Also, he kept looking at Zoltan Tildy all along, as if expecting support.
Tildy behaved with dignity. He spoke immediately after Imre Nagy, in a tone that was much friendlier and calmer. He said that if the Soviet troops continued their advance on Budapest, there would be a scandal and the Government would be forced to resign. Tildy would like to prevent the workers’ anger turning against the Soviet Union.
Tildy said that he insisted that the Soviet troops—at least those which are not stationed in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Pact—be withdrawn without delay.
Kadar supported Nagy; Haraszti and Ferenc Erdei spoke very nervously and in a manner unfriendly to us. Dobi remained silent. After they spoke I offered my views—in keeping with the instructions I had received. Nagy immediately replied that although he accepted that my statement was good, it did not answer the Hungarian Government’s question.
Nagy proposed that, since the Soviet Government had not stopped the advance of the Soviet troops, nor had it given a satisfactory explanation of its actions, they confirm the motion passed that morning regarding Hungary’s giving notice of cessation of Warsaw Pact membership, a declaration of neutrality, and an appeal to the United Nations for the guarantee of Hungary’s neutrality by the Four Great Powers. In the event that the Soviet Government stopped the advance of the Soviet troops and withdrew them beyond its own borders with immediate effect, (the Government of the Hungarian People’s Republic will form a judgment on compliance on the basis of the reports of its own armed forces) the Hungarian Government would withdraw its request to the United Nations, but Hungary would still remain neutral. Erdei and Losonczy strongly supported this reply by Nagy. Tildy’s reponse was affirmative but more reserved, while Kadar’s reaction was reluctant. Dobi remained silent.
One hour later the Embassy received the note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, declaring that since a strong Soviet Army force had crossed the border that day and had entered Hungarian territory against the firm protest of the Hungarian Government, the Government was leaving the Warsaw Pact with immediate effect. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Embassy to notify the Soviet Government of this decision immediately. They sent notes with a similar content to every embassy and diplomatic mission in Budapest.
Note: We have information that, at the instigation of the Social Democrats, the workers of all the enterprises in Hungary have declared a two-week strike, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. 1.11.56