Acest articol este varianta în limba engleză a articolului Alegerile din România: președintele-cetățean și potențialul unui val de redemocratizare în Europa Centrală și de Est

Introduction

In 1999, Timothy Garton Ash argued that the idea of “Central Europe” was a cultural construct that had been reshaped and used in the 1990s by the states in the Visegrád Group to symbolically legitimize the “return to Europe” of the former communist countries. Reclaiming this Central European identity—beyond its interwar geographical and cultural connotations—also served to justify Romania’s exclusion from the early stages of EU accession negotiations (Ash 1999). The Visegrád states were eager to advance these negotiations as swiftly as possible. This symbolic decoupling of Romania from “Central Europe” had enduring political consequences, contributing to its alignment with Bulgaria as a “laggard state” in the Euro-Atlantic integration process. This association endures to this day, as seen in their shared path toward accession to the Schengen Area.

More than three decades after this political decoupling—due in part to internal shortcomings—Romania elected Nicușor Dan in 2025. A former civic activist, Dan is the first “citizen-president” in the region’s post-accession history. His election carries profound symbolic weight. As several commentators have noted, his victory signals the maturation of a Europeanized civic culture that emerged and consolidated under more adverse conditions than those faced by other Central European states. Dan’s success is all the more notable given the forces he confronted: a post-communist political system that produced a hybrid regime, and a populist, anti-European opposition bolstered by Russian influence. This interference was apparent not only during the campaign for the annulled 2024 presidential elections, but also throughout the 2025 race and sought to redefine Romania’s foreign policy stance, particularly its support for Ukraine and Moldova.

This election takes place in the midst of a global decline of liberal democracy, after more than 15 years of gradual autocratization that began in Eastern Europe in the late 1990s (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Against this background, this article examines the impact of the Romanian elections on regional democracy and presents some key conclusions. Its central argument is that the election of a civil society-emerged president in Romania can serve as a lesson of resistance to autocratic tendencies, but may also signal the beginning of a new wave of redemocratization in the CEE region. Whether this trend gains traction, however, depends on the results of several crucial elections, namely the presidential elections in Poland in June 2025, the parliamentary elections in Moldova in September 2025 and – most importantly – the parliamentary elections in Hungary, which are expected to take place in spring 2026.

Where We Stand – The State of Western Democracy

Global democracy is currently undergoing a visible period of decline. The first signs of this trend appeared in the late 1990s, when the democratization wave sparked by annus mirabilis 1989 extended to only parts of the former Soviet space and began to encounter setbacks in Central and Eastern Europe (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019). However, clear manifestations of democratic backsliding only became evident after the 2008 global financial crisis, when even democracies previously considered nearly consolidated—such as Hungary—began to drift in an illiberal direction.

In 2010, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party came to power in Hungary. Over the following decade, Orbán’s regime undertook a fundamental transformation of the country’s constitutional architecture. International watchdog organizations reclassified Hungary from a consolidated democracy to a hybrid regime. Fidesz achieved this by systematically capturing state institutions, exploiting a constitutional provision that allows amendments with a two-thirds parliamentary majority—a threshold that the authors of Hungary’s 1990s constitution assumed no single party could realistically attain in free elections. Yet, amid widespread public discontent following the economic crisis, Fidesz managed to achieve that. This supermajority enabled what Bozóki and Hegedűs (Bozóki and Hegedűs 2018) describe as a “constitutional capture” of the state, which effectively altered the foundations of Hungary’s political regime.

Bálint Magyar (Magyar 2016) characterizes this transformation as the emergence of a “mafia state”. Unlike classic authoritarian takeovers, this shift was not achieved through overt violence, but through a gradual, step-by-step process that the literature refers to as “executive aggrandizement” (Bermeo 2016)—a slow concentration of executive power until the state becomes fully subordinated. A striking example of this strategy was the takeover of key state institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military. Before 2010, these institutions were both led and staffed by professionals socialized in the spirit of European norms and, due to this, they were considered capable of resisting authoritarian encroachments. However, beginning in 2015 they were systematically purged and gradually staffed with Fidesz loyalists (Müller and Gazsi 2023).

Yet, for some time, Hungary appeared to be an outlier within the Euro-Atlantic space, while those comparable cases needed to explain its autocratization were more commonly found in regions with weaker democratic traditions, such as Latin America. For a few years, the prevailing explanation for Hungary’s democratic erosion was its incomplete consolidation: robust, fully consolidated democracies were presumed to possess institutional safeguards capable of resisting authoritarian turns.

However, recent developments in the United States—especially those taking place during Donald Trump’s second term—call this assumption into question. That is because, during the past five months, even the world’s longest-standing and seemingly most consolidated liberal democracy has shown signs of vulnerability to autocratic tendencies. The federal structure of the U.S. provides indeed some protection against the centralization of power, but its limitations have proven significant. For instance, the New York governor’s opposition to some controversial federal initiatives shows that, to a degree, subnational actors can prevent executive overreach (Oreskes 2025). Still, to date it remains uncertain whether the institutional framework established by the Founding Fathers will be resilient enough to prevent systemic autocratization.

All these developments call for a critical reassessment of “consolidated democracy”, a concept that has long been considered analytically stable and practically a safeguard against democratic erosion. Yet, the notion that institutional maturity alone ensures the longevity of democracy is increasingly being called into question.

How We Got Here – The Wave of Autocratization

The current backsliding of global liberal democracy is the result of multiple factors, prompting political scientists to reconsider long-standing concepts such as “consolidated democracy”. The ongoing trend of autocratization directly challenges the core hypothesis that, once democracies reach a certain threshold of institutional consolidation, their trajectories become irreversible. This idea is based on the assumption that democratic norms are so deeply ingrained and institutionalized that no political actor would seriously attempt to overturn them. However, there were three major developments that have shaken this theoretical foundation: the 2008 global financial crisis, the rise of populism, and the emergence of an anti-liberal “international” that calls into question the liberal global order.

The 2008 crisis had not only severe economic consequences, but also far-reaching political ramifications. Austerity measures implemented in most Western countries in its aftermath triggered widespread social unrest and disillusionment with traditional elites and paved the way for new political figures—especially populists—who, within less than a decade, grew into a global phenomenon. This trend was further amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Economically, the crisis marked the culmination of a prolonged era of stagnation and gave rise to new generations—particularly millennials—who now face diminished earnings and less economic security compared to their parents (Inglehart and Norris 2016). But, most importantly, it deepened the divide between economic and political liberalism. On one hand, deregulation and overreliance on markets resulted in a systemic collapse. On the other, political liberalism shifted its focus to identity politics to defend individual rights, which alienated segments of the electorate who felt left behind (Mounk 2018).

Thus, the crisis set in motion two parallel social dynamics. First, it produced a “precarious class” of economically insecure workers who began demanding a more interventionist state. At the same time, this group became increasingly receptive to nationalist messages, which can be interpreted as an indirect call for state protection (Tamir 2020). Second, and maybe more significant, this electorate proved highly susceptible to populist rhetoric, with its emotional, combative, and performative style, which was offered as a stark contrast to the technocratic language of traditional political elites. The rise of social media further accelerated the spread of this populist discourse, particularly during the pandemic.

The situation became more acute when the economic grievances of this precarious class converged with the nationalist discourse of right-wing populism. What fused these disparate demands into a coherent political force was sovereignism. As an ideological glue, sovereignism proved capable not only of generating public sympathy, but also of mobilizing social movements with destabilizing potential. Initially promoted by the Kremlin under the guise of “sovereign democracy,” and later simply “sovereignism” (Comunitatea Liberala 2025), this discourse was meant to offer an ideological alternative to both globalization and liberalism and, due to this reason, was quickly embraced by populist parties across Europe and beyond.

Although populist movements usually begin by targeting only domestic institutions, as Fidesz did in Hungary, in time they tend to garner broader regional and even global support. The danger escalates when these actors—whether state or non-state—begin coordinating internationally instead of acting independently. Anne Applebaum (Applebaum 2024) refers to this phenomenon as “Autocracy. Inc” and defines it as a transnational alliance of states and parties—as well as individuals—who collaborate to undermine liberal democracy within their own countries and on a global scale.

While ideologically uniform, this network is geographically diverse. It includes political actors and organizations ranging from Russia, China and Hungary to Romania’s AUR party and far-right groups in Latin America, including El Salvador’s “Nuevas Ideas” party, led by President Nayib Bukele. Directly or indirectly, all of these actors are connected to the discourse, but, most importantly, the networks of the MAGA movement in the United States (Abrahamsen et al. 2024). Thus, what initially appeared to be a localized backlash against globalization has evolved into a coordinated global offensive against the liberal postwar order itself.

How Do We Stop Democratic Backsliding?

By the time the Western world began to grasp the true scale of the threat, the key elements of the global authoritarian surge were already firmly in place. When the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. presidential election—both marred by documented Russian interference—took place, the “sovereigntist international” was already on the rise. This movement gained electoral ground by combing three ideological pillars: sovereignism (a rejection of global elites and the liberal international order), nationalism (often drawing on interwar traditions tinged with fascist nostalgia), and populism (defined by the binary opposition between a virtuous “people” and a corrupt “elite”) (Mudde 2004).

Once Western liberal elites fully grasped the remarkable organizational coherence and scope of this global autocratic alliance, they managed to articulate the key question of our time: How can liberal democracy be saved? (Applebaum 2024). Beyond that, how can the postwar liberal international order be defended—both domestically and globally—against an assault of unprecedented magnitude that not only wins elections but also captures institutions and imposes authoritarian rule?

The first conceptual response to these questions was resistance to autocratization (Tomini, Gibril, and Bochev 2023). Drawing on the experiences of countries like Ecuador and Tunisia, this approach typically involves civic mobilizations that escalate into mass protests. Recently, such movements have reappeared in places like Georgia and Serbia, occasionally drawing international attention and limited external support. Yet their outcomes remain uneven. On one hand, Western democracies are frequently absorbed in their own internal crises. On the other, the normative pressure once exerted by the West on authoritarian regimes has weakened considerably—especially as the U.S. has distanced itself from its traditional role in promoting democratization, a stance it had at least tacitly upheld during the Arab Spring (Rhodes 2018). By contrast, today, the U.S. administration is in some cases indifferent and in others even overtly hostile to such pro-democracy social movements.

A recent example of this hostility is offered by the mass protest that erupted in Turkey following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, which took place on March 19, 2025. According to sources within the U.S. Congress (Gönül Tol [@gonultol] 2025) and the Turkish opposition (Medya News 2025), President Erdoğan may have received tacit approval for his repressive actions against the opposition over a phone conversation with President Trump.

Moreover, street protests—even large-scale ones—can only go so far without an organized political opposition capable of contesting and winning elections. In many hybrid regimes, where the political landscape is monopolized by the ruling party and the opposition is systematically marginalized, this becomes an almost insurmountable challenge.

The first clear sign that opposition forces—either from civil society or the political sphere—could achieve significant electoral victories came from Moldova in 2020, when Maia Sandu defeated a Russian-backed oligarchic regime and managed to win the presidency. However, Moldova’s case is highly context-specific and, thus, rather difficult to replicate elsewhere.

Another important precedent was set in Poland in 2023, when the Civic Coalition triumphed over the Law and Justice Party (PiS) and, at the end of that year, managed to establish in Warsaw a pro-European government under Donald Tusk. Yet even here, the limits of generalization are clear. Poland is an EU member state with a long tradition of anti-authoritarian civic activism dating back to the Solidarity movement and maintained a robust opposition throughout PiS’s rule.

Today, Romania is emerging as one of the most significant and instructive cases in the search for democratic counterstrategies. In May 2025, after the first round of presidential elections was annulled due to Russian interference, a candidate from civil society—a “citizen-president”—was elected in the re-run. Romania’s example offers a powerful lesson for those seeking ways to counter authoritarianism: civil society matters. When political parties are weak or compromised, and institutional opposition is fragile, civil society can serve as the decisive democratic force—capable not only of mobilizing the public, but of winning elections.

Romania’s Elections as a Double Victory

Romania’s election of Nicușor Dan as president is remarkable from multiple perspectives. Dan is a former civic activist and former mayor of Bucharest. Before entering politics, the current Romanian president played a central role in urban planning NGOs and then in broader democratization social movements that shaped Romanian civil society beginning in the late 2000s. His election marks a historic first. Romania is the first post-accession Eastern European state to elect a “citizen-president,” a development that sends a powerful message of hope across the region and beyond. This moment has also significantly enhanced Romania’s soft power on the international stage almost overnight.

As President Dan emphasized in his post-election speech, this victory belongs above all to Romania’s pro-European civil society. Even more striking is the nature of the battle it won—not against a single opponent, but against two formidable adversaries. Since 2021, Romania had entered the logic of a hybrid regime (Economist Intelligence Unit 2025), in which the dominant parties – PSD (the socialists) and PNL (the liberals) – formed a coalition which captured both political life and state institutions, sidelining the pro-European liberal opposition—primarily USR and REPER. Simultaneously, a nationalist social movement morphed into an active sovereigntist force, represented by figures such as Călin Georgescu and George Simion, and supported openly by the PSD (Coșlea 2025), the PNL (Neag et al. 2024), the Kremlin, and the MAGA movement in the United States.

One of the most notable aspects of Romania’s case is that its pro-European civil society has not relied heavily on street protests in recent years. The last major demonstration occurred on August 10, 2018, during the Dragnea regime (Baciu 2018). Romania’s distinctiveness lies elsewhere: over the past decade, its civil society has undergone a process of political institutionalization, beginning with the tragic Colectiv nightclub fire in October 2015 (Predoiu 2015). In the aftermath, a technocratic government led by Dacian Cioloș (2015–2016) was appointed (Poenariu 2015), marking the first time civil society engaged directly with the public administration.

This commitment was soon reflected in political participation. In 2016, the NGO “Save Bucharest Union” became the liberal political party “Save Romania Union” (USR) under the leadership of current president Nicușor Dan. The party achieved representation in local councils and in parliament. Since then, civil society actors have continued on their institutional path, actively participating in USR and REPER and integrating into traditional parties such as the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD).

During the communist era, Ceaușescu’s regime violently suppressed civic initiatives. As a result, there were no organized dissident movements in Romania as in countries such as Poland, where Solidarność shaped the post-communist transition (Parau 2009). In the 1990s, Romanian civil society struggled to develop, especially after the Iliescu regime brutally repressed pro-democracy protesters on University Square (Agerpres 2020). The conditions for developing a vibrant civil society sector only became favorable after the beginning of EU accession negotiations, thanks to institutionalized consultation mechanisms and access to European funding.

However, this did not automatically produce a genuine civil society. In response to EU requirements for civil society consultation in policymaking, Romanian authorities often ended up creating a “parallel civil society” (Soare and Tufiș 2021), usually composed of individuals closely tied to the state apparatus. Yet, the European Union offered something far more valuable to authentic civic actors – namely, a strategic toolkit for internationalization. This included the ability to lobby at the European level, but also to learn from Western European civic movements and their democratization efforts (Parau 2009).

The key lesson Romania offers to pro-democracy actors facing authoritarian tendencies is clear: street mobilization alone is not enough. Institutionalization—both within and outside formal politics—is essential. By forming or joining political parties, civil society can become an organized political actor, capable of shaping democratic outcomes. This reflects the vision of civil society articulated by Solidarity thinkers in the 1980s (Arato 1981).

In conclusion, Nicușor Dan’s election as president is a pivotal moment for Romania. For the first time, the political capital accumulated by civil society over the past two decades has been converted into institutional power at the highest level of the state. This development has profound implications for domestic politics and sends a strong message to the Central and Eastern European region, where civic space has steadily shrunk under illiberal and hybrid regimes (Greskovits 2020).

Romania demonstrates that civil society can evolve from protest to governance—and that deep democratic transformation is not only a response to crisis, but also the result of long-term institutional engagement. The Romanian case shows that resisting autocratic drift is not enough; enduring alternatives rooted in civic mobilization and capable of governing are vital.

What Comes Next – An Eastern Wave of Redemocratization?

On June 1, the Romanian precedent could be reinforced if Rafał Trzaskowski, the pro-European candidate and mayor of Warsaw, wins the second round of Poland’s presidential election. Trzaskowski represents an active, urban-based civil society. Victories in both Romania and Poland would signal the beginning of a new phase in Eastern Europe’s evolution—one in which pro-European and pro-democratic forces gain the most favorable window of opportunity in over a decade to reverse the autocratizing momentum that began with Viktor Orbán’s 2010 victory in the wake of the global economic crisis.

What makes this potential wave of redemocratization particularly significant is that it no longer relies solely on democratic contagion—on societies learning from each other through parallel experiences. Today’s electoral movements in Central and Eastern Europe are forging something more: transnational solidarity among liberal political leaders.

This phenomenon has already been visible in the 2024 and 2025 presidential elections in Romania and Moldova. It was also present in the open support Donald Tusk extended to Hungarian opposition leader Péter Márki-Zay during the 2022 Hungarian elections, when Polish liberal figures joined campaign rallies in Budapest. Most recently, Tusk expressed his backing for Nicușor Dan ahead of the Romanian election, further illustrating this growing regional alliance. Tusk, perhaps the Eastern European leader with the most profound understanding of the historical moment, draws from his formative experience in the Solidarity movement. President Dan’s recent private visit to Poland underscored this bond; just a week before Poland’s decisive second round, he publicly endorsed Trzaskowski (Furlong 2025).

Hungary occupies a pivotal role in this emerging architecture of democratic solidarity. After more than a decade of authoritarian consolidation under Viktor Orbán, the rise of the Tisza Party—outpolling Fidesz consistently for the past year (Bence 2025)—suggests that a governmental and possibly regime change could occur by next spring. Péter Magyar, a former government insider turned dissident, represents a unique blend of modern, civic-minded discourse, although with some nationalist undertones, and also a clear European orientation. He is emerging as a central figure in this potential regional redemocratization.

This evolution in Hungary is deeply connected to the democratic momentum in Romania and Poland. Magyar has firmly positioned himself against George Simion, the Romanian far-right leader who was the first to qualify in the final round of Romania’s presidential election (Jégo 2025), as well as against Orbán’s support of Simion. From May 14 to 24, Magyar walked from Budapest to Oradea, a city on the Romanian-Hungarian border, to engage with the Hungarian community in Transylvania. This group played a key role in President Dan’s electoral victory. In a speech delivered in Oradea on May 24, he addressed the Hungarian minority in Romania and invited the new leadership in Bucharest to deepen regional cooperation (Zrt 2025). The most consequential step toward a regional democratic revival would be for liberal leaders in Bucharest and Warsaw to actively support the alternative embodied by Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party.

As Timothy Garton Ash (Ash 1999) noted, the concept of “Central Europe” in the post-communist era was a political construct, one that separated “us” from “them” within the broader Eastern European region—distinguishing countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary (deemed ready for EU accession) from Romania and Bulgaria, which were seen as lagging behind. Today, however, the election of a president from civil society in Romania symbolically overturns that exclusionary logic. Romania is no longer returning to Europe as a peripheral nation struggling to catch up with the core. It is returning as an equal actor—one capable of shaping the democratic reconstruction of the region.

In this new context, transnational solidarity among liberal leaders from Romania, Poland, and potentially Hungary is more than an expression of political alignment; it is becoming a binding force for the future of democracy in Eastern Europe. With its citizen-president, Romania is no longer an outlier—it is a central player and a catalyst for what may become a new wave of redemocratization in the region.

Note:

This is the English version of the Romanian original text (translated and adapted for international audiences), which can be found here.

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